Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Late medieval Europe was characterized by a revival of trade among the regions of the continent and the emergence of complementary trade-related innovations, a time commonly characterized as the Commercial Revolution (Lopez 1976) . Merchants travelled with their goods from one city to the next and many fair locations emerged where traders from different parts of Europe met (Verlinden 1971; Blockmans 1996) . An important step in the evolution of trade was the separation of the quid and quo (Greif 2002 (Greif , 2006 . This means that the payment for purchased goods no longer took place at the same time and place but at the next fair or market, either at the same or at a different location. Alongside this development appeared financial instruments like the cambium, letter obligatory, or the bill of exchange, which were orders or promises of future payment at a specific time and place, typically during the payment days at the end of a fair, by the drawer or his representative or banker (Goldschmidt 1891; Schapps 1892; de Roover 1953) . This was very useful for a merchant, since he could negotiate a time and place when and where he expected to be liquid again, for example after the successful trading of goods or when he expected to cash in bills himself. Cashless payment was a good alternative to carrying heavy gold or silver coins along dangerous trading routes. In addition, it limited the dependency of merchants on the currency policies of local dukes. Finally, the use of cashless payment helped to overcome the money shortage during the Later Middle Ages due to the scarcity of silver and gold bullion (Miskimin 1984; Spufford 1988 ). The only downside was the limited tradability of the financial instruments (Usher 1943; Van der Wee 1963; North 1981; Munro 1994;  for a discussion see Boerner and Ritschl 2006, 2009) .
As a consequence of this development, a need for the settlement of liabilities, typically at the end of a fair or market period, arose. Merchants and merchant bankers met to settle bills of exchange and other liabilities to balance their positions. At fairs and market locations, permanent payment days were established over time and, during the 16 th century, exclusive clearing fairs in Besancon and later Piacenza and Novi were estab-2 lished where mainly bills of exchange were settled from all over Europe (Endemann 1885; Neuhaus 1892; Ehrenberg 1896; Vigne 1903; Haristoy 1906; Prausnitz 1928; Carande 1943; Lapeyre 1955; Da Silva 1969; Gascon 1971; Boyer-Xambeu et. al.1986; Denzel 1994 Denzel , 2009 . At these late medieval and early modern markets and fairs a specific decentralized multilateral clearing algorithm to offset non-tradable credits with debts was developed. This netting procedure is known in the sources as rescontrire, rescontre, skontrieren, or vivre compte / des parties.
In a nutshell, the procedure worked as follows: all merchants met on fixed days at the end of the market or fair, everybody revealed his debtors, and creditors had to confirm their liabilities. Then, merchants tried to offset credits with debts through a decentralized searching and matching procedure: in the first step, they cancelled reciprocal debts, in the second step, they used clearing cycles, and, in the third and final step, they using clearing chains. At the end, still unbalanced positions had to be paid in cash or new bills had to be drawn.
This clearing mechanism developed at late medieval fairs and was perfected at the financial fairs of the late 16 th and early 17 th century, where it developed into a formal procedure embedded in a legal framework. This was the dominant debt-clearing mechanism in Europe's most important trade centres: Germany, Italy, France, the Low Countries, and Spain.
These markets and fairs not only built the central nodes of European finance and trade but also acquired capital to finance trade with the New World. (Ehrenberg 1896 , Da Silva 1969 , Boyer-Xambeu et. al.1986 van der Wee 1993 , Pezzolo and Tattaro 2008 , Denzel 2009 ).
It waned in importance when the first exchange banks took over the clearing business and general endorsement of bills of exchange during the 17 th century (Schneider 1989; Brübach 1994) . Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that this decentralized procedure was still in use at many markets and fairs during the 17 th and 18 th century. In addition, traders who worked under the first stock exchange markets used the same technique to offset payments for stocks or future contracts in cities like Amsterdam and London (Parker 3 1974; Gelderbloom and Jonker 2005) . After the establishment of the London Clearing Club in 1775, banks began settling their liabilities in a similar way (Seyd 1872). Thus this decentralized multilateral clearing algorithm was the backbone of financial clearing during more than 500 years of pre-industrial growth in Europe.
The research questions of interest are 1) why such clearing mechanisms came into existence and 2) why they were so successful for several hundred years. Of course, these clearing mechanisms reduced the need for cash. However, these mechanisms had to have achieved a high clearing rate. On the one hand, merchant books and contemporary witnesses document that the mechanism was quite successful. On the other hand, legal documents give evidence that merchants were more or less forced to participate in these mechanisms and were not allowed to pay in cash. In addition, there is evidence that merchants had preferences over the choice of their clearing partners and the clearing order.
Not much attention has been paid to the microstructure of this clearing mechanism so far. Legal and economic historians focused on the description, not on institutional analysis.
These authors did not come to a clear conclusion about the clearing efficiency. While they recognised the use of the clearing technology for cashless payment all over Europe to generate credit and solve problems of money shortage (Neuhaus 1892; Ehrenberg 1896; Boyer-Xambieu 1986; Brübach 1986; M. North. 1996; Denzel 2005 Denzel , 2009 ), a valuation of the clearing mechanism has been missing or efficiency has been assumed simply because of the success of the mechanism. Alternatively, it has been argued that the mechanism was inefficient because the clearing was decentralized and looked rather complicated.
In contrast to these approaches we use a theory-guided approach (Greif 1993 , 2006 , Greif et al. 1994 to study the efficiency of the settlement mechanism. We analyze the main characteristics of the clearing procedure and develop a theoretical model of the mechanism and proceed to analyze its properties. We examine the matching and clearing of nontradable assets which are complementary in utility to each other when matched efficiently.
This modelling goes back to allocation methods using the successive removal of cycles, 4 which were first proposed by Shapley and Scarf (1974) for the housing allocation problem and subsequently studied by researchers such as Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2002), and Ehlers (2002) . Recently, Alvin Roth et al. (2004; 2005) applied these techniques to the kidney exchange problem.
We show that the functioning of these mechanisms depends on the balance of positions (credits and debts) of merchants ex ante and the use of clearing cycles or clearing chains. If positions are balanced, then efficient clearing is always achievable with clearing cycles and also with clearing chains. If positions are unbalanced, and only cycles are used, then depending on the ordering of the cycles different levels of clearing efficiencies can be achieved, and some agents may have both credits and debts at the end. However, if chains are used, each merchant will be reduced to his net position. However, depending on the clearing order, the distribution of debt transfers among merchants differs ex post. These properties can lead to strategic behavior of merchants in the form of strategic misrepresentation of information and an unwillingness to participate in specific cycles or chains. This can reduce the efficiency of the clearing.
Consequently, the clearing efficiency depends on the willingness of the merchants to participate in the clearing mechanism in general and the willingness to participate in specific cycles or chains in particular, and these both depend on the expected balance of the positions and the enforcement of unbalanced positions ex post. This enforcement can be achieved through reputation effects or through legal enforcement. Finally, in unbalanced positions, the liquidity of the market after the mutual clearing has been done is important; the ability to draw new bills on future clearing locations increases the willingness to participate ex ante although the merchants expect that positions will be unbalanced ex post. Thus, if merchants are willing to participate in the mechanism all gross positions can be cleared to the net positions by a decentralized search and matching mechanism independent of the ordering of the use of bilateral clearing, cycles, or chains.
These results can explain the self-organizing emergence of this mechanism during the late Middle Ages in fairs and financial markets and why during the early modern period a specific form of this mechanism embedded in a legal framework evolved all over Europe. In addition, it can be shown why the mechanism was generally robust and only vulnerable in cases of strong economic shocks or of political abuse. This made it difficult for competing institutions such as the public exchange banks to take over the clearing business.
The remainder of the paper is structured the following way: Section 2 examines the history of the mechanism, from its early development in the late Middle Ages to its perfection in the 16 th and 17 th century. In addition, the role of exchange banks, endorsement of bills of exchange, the emergence of the mechanism on the first stock exchanges, and the use of the mechanism in the form of clearing clubs among banks are discussed. Section 3 studies the mechanism more formally. A theoretical game model is set up which analyzes the algorithm; the equilibrium outcomes are discussed. In Section 4 the theoretical predicted outcomes are discussed in their historical context. Both the successes and the vulnerabilities of the mechanism are elaborated in detail. Section 5 concludes. The proofs of propositions in Section 3 may be found in the Appendix.
Historical Development
Section 2 gives a comprehensive historical analysis of the mechanism: Section 2.1 describes the early development until the 16 th century, and the formation of the formal procedure and legislation during the 16 th and early 17 th century, Section 2.2 describes the rules and customary practices, Section 2.3 details the further development, and finally Section 2.4 provides an evaluation of the efficiency based on descriptive source analysis. (Orth 1765 , p. 446, Wolf 1967 , p. 205f., Bücher 1915 , p. 212f. Brübach 1994 , in France at Lyon (Ehrenberg 1886, pp. 74-8; Vinge 1903, pp. 110ff.; Haristoy 1906, pp. 296-301; Bresard 1914 , Gascon 1971 Boyer-Xambeu 1986, pp. 189-198) (Neuhaus 1892, p. 11; Prausnitz 1928, p. 22; Brübach 1994, p. 175, 318) . 5 These clearing meetings lasted several days. In Besancon for example it took eight days, always in a fixed ordering.
Early Development and the Formation of a Formal Procedure
In most regulations there were no restrictions on participation. Once the set of participants had been determined, all creditors revealed their debtors. 7 The debtors had to confirm or reject the debts. 8 In the next step, each banker had to create a balance sheet with all the accepted claims, which had to be submitted in Besancon where officials would check the general balance. 9 This practice cannot be documented for other fairs later on. Only accepted bills were taken in and were valid for the later mutual netting procedure. Rejected bills were discussed in front of the fair court and settled later. 10 This regulation was also in use in all other fairs (Endemann 1885, p. 175ff; Prausnitz 1928, p. 17; Brübach 1994, p. 309) . De Turri writes that not all bankers were honest and hence were willing to go in front of the court in order to settle some bills later (Endemann 1885, p. 177).
In the next step the exchange rates for the bills were fixed in an official accounting currency. This was done by a group of bankers from different regions who had participated in the clearing process. On the Genoese fairs they came only from different regions in Italy (Endemann 1885, p. 179f.; Ehrenberg 1896, p. 232), in Lyon from France, Germany and
Italy (Gascon 1971, pp. 244f.) . 11 The regulations of Besancon state that exchange rates should be reasonable. However, based on these rates, other market prices were negotiated ex post (Ehrenberg 1896, p. 234f.). Having participants from different regions set exchange rates collectively was also typical for later regulations. In Frankfurt, where the fixing of the exchange rate can be documented from 1585 onwards, in 1625 legislation was passed after some bankers at previous fair meetings tried to manipulate exchange rates in their favor; it was stated that the exchange rates were to be decided by local exchange brokers and merchant bankers from different regions (Ehrenberg 1896 , pp. 246f. Brübach 1994 .
In the next step, merchants started the actual clearing process, sometimes with the help of brokers. 12 This process was organized as a decentralized searching and matching procedure. The codified legal rules in various cities are rather cryptic in describing the process. banker A owed B and B at the same time owed A, the common amount could be directly cancelled out. 15 In the next step merchants tried to find clearing cycles and clearing chains.
In a clearing cycle, for example, A owed B, B owed C, and C owed A a certain amount of money. The common amount then could also be cancelled. 16 In contrast, in a clearing chain, where A owed B and B owed C, only B could clear his debts and the amount that could be cancelled out had to be transferred into a new debt relationship between A and C. These clearing mechanisms could easily include seven or eight parties (Koenigk 1727, p. 66; Orth 1765, p. 481; p. E.B.A. 1773, p. 109f. time came to an end or no merchant could find another clearing partner since everybody had reached his net position. In the exchange regulations, differentiated rules arose about the constraints on participation in the clearing mechanism. In general, the rules gave the merchants the freedom to choose the clearing cycle or chains in which they wanted to participate. de Turri mentions this as an early practice. In addition, we can find the clause that everybody needs to agree to the specific clearing group in most of the exchange laws from the 17 th century. After the mutual netting was finished, merchants had to check if they still had outstanding credits or debts. All mutual settlements had to have been written in their scartefacci and having all participants do this made the clearing official. 18 In general all transfers made by the mechanism were final. This meant if a debtor was transferred to a new creditor, the old creditor was no longer liable. 19 Only in Besancon was it customary practice that everybody within a clearing chain or cycle was collectively liable. 20 Legislation ensured that the payment of debts through the clearing mechanism had the same legal status as paying cash. 21 Even when it turned out ex post that one merchant was bankrupt, priority was given to the debts that were settled by the mechanism. 22 Factually, this meant that the payment could not be reversed. This way the mechanism was protected from an ex post unravelling of the settled debts.
In the next step the remaining debts would be settled. Controversial bills which had been rejected by the debtors were judged by the local court (Ehrenberg 1896, p. 236). The payment of outstanding debts could be in cash or by drawing new bills with promises on future payments within a fixed period. 23 In Augsburg 1778 it was forbidden to draw new bills on one's own name; only cash was allowed (Neuhaus, p. 32 was in Barcelona in 1401 (Usher 1943; Braudel 1966; Lane and Mueller 1985) . The exclusive right was given to most of these banks to handle the exchange business. However from the fragmented data we possess we know that merchants were not interested in using these centralized institutions to balance their positions. After the founding of the bank in Venice, in 1593 a regulation was passed which forbade the use of the rescontre technique;
all bills had to be brought to the Bank. This regulation was later rescinded and decentralized clearing was allowed again (Lattes 1869, pp. 170f. were not willing to use the institution (van Dillen 1964, p.398; Sneller 1940, pp. 157-160) .
When the bank started its activities, private cashiers were forbidden to conduct the clearing business, but by 1621 the decision was reversed. In 1700 merchants were forced up to an amount of 600 and later 300 guilders to use the bank (van Velden 1933) . In Hamburg in 1693 they were forced to use the bank for amounts higher than 400 marks. Merchants were not allowed to use the direct clearing procedure (Prausnitz 1928, p. 26) . In Nuremberg, bank orders from 1654 and 1721 inform us that merchants were not allowed to use the Skontration to settle their bills, but had to bring them to the exchange bank. In addition, the orders from 1654 indicate that merchants were only willing to hand in the bills which they could not clear easily or that were unbalanced positions (Neuhaus 1992, p. 12; Prausnitz, p. 1928 Bozen (Haristoy 1906, pp. 309f.) . This was probably due to the fact that these exchange places did not allow for endorsement (Schneider 1991, pp152f.) . Hence, the town officals from Lyon feared disorder in the clearing mechanism. A similar story of resistance to the endorsement technique as documented in Frankfurt can be reported from Italian fair locations. The reason for this opposition could be seen in the strong lobbying of the wellestablished bankers of these fairs since the use of the endorsed bills reduced the need of the exchange fairs (Prausnitz 1928, p. 21; Neuhaus 1892 p. 11, Schneider 1991 . 
Efficiency of the Mechanism: Evidence from Merchant Books and Contemporary Witnesses
Having outlined the historical evolution of these clearing mechanisms, it remains to be answered whether or not these mechanisms were efficient in the sense that a high clearing rate could be achieved without paying cash or writing new bills if not necessary. The existence of the mechanism across Europe and the preference by merchants to use the mechanism instead of central public exchange banks indicates that this institutional solution must have worked relatively well. In addition, the large numbers of bills cleared this way gives further evidence (Ehrenberg 1896) that these clearing fairs were successful. It seems that only the economic or political abuse of the institution by manipulating exchange rates or delaying payment or bankruptcy of some major merchant bankers or economic crises led to a downturn of these decentralized clearing mechanisms. (Prausnitz 1928, p. 25 ) mentioned with the emergence of exchange banks that they were surprised that not more places had a centralized exchange bank since they were better than the decentralized clearing procedure. Based on these reports, the mechanism must have been rather successful.
However if the mechanism was so successful and led to a high clearing rate, why did some of the regulations force merchants to participate and not to pay cash in advance?
Why did the statutes mention the freedom of merchants over the order and the clearing partnerships in which they could be involved? If the mechanism worked that well why did merchants have preferences about clearing different clearing chains and cycles? Could the endorsement of the bills of exchange have been so vulnerable for the mechanism in use?
We now turn to a theoretical model of the mechanism to answer these questions. We will only consider mechanisms that leave unchanged every trader's net position.
Hence, each trader's utility is defined only over the total number of outstanding commitments he has. We define the utility function of trader i as
where α i,j is the disutility for agent i of holding a debt from agent j. Note that this can vary between agents; some agent j may be a good credit risk for i and have a low α i,j , while some other agent k may be a poor credit risk, and hence α i,k will be quite large. We also assume that the utility of the trader is just a total of the disutility of each credit he is holding from other agents.
In this context, a Pareto efficient allocation is any allocation that maximizes a weighted sum of utilities. We also wish to consider the strategic implications of the mechanisms used.
At a fair, an announced debt had to be confirmed by the presumptive debtor. Hence, strategic considerations are important: mechanisms that allow manipulation by denying debts (which the debtor can then pay off later) must not improve outcomes for the manipulator:
otherwise, the merchants will have an incentive to deny debts during the clearing process, which may ruin the ability of these debt clearing mechanisms to function efficiently.
Therefore, we will assume that agents have the ability to deny a debt: that is, for any d i,j > 0, agent i can deny the debt, and the mechanism must proceed as if d i,j = 0.
Formally, the strategy set of the agent i (for a given allocation A) will consist of confirming or denying d i,j for any d i,j > 0. The mechanism will then proceed using the input allocation A , which is the allocation including only confirmed debts.
The Case of Balanced Positions
We first consider the case when each agent i's financial position is balanced, in the sense that he is neither a net debtor or creditor: that is, for all i ∈ N, we have that
Note that in this case the only Pareto optimal allocation is unique, and
In this section we first wish to consider the cycle removal mechanism. For this mech- Note that we have not defined in what order the cycle removal mechanism removes cycles. However, the exact order of the cycle removal does not concern us, as it does not affect the final outcome:
Proposition 1. If all agents have a balanced position, any cycle removal mechanism will completely clear all debts and hence is efficient.
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The essence of the proof lies in accounting: if some agent i has a debt, then the agent j to whom i owes a debt owes a debt in turn to someone else, as his position is balanced.
Since all positions are balanced, this string of logic can be continued until a cycle is found;
there are only N agents, so at some point this chain must bend back in on itself.
Since, with balanced positions, all debts are cleared, we have that it is a Nash equilibrium for agents to truthfully reveal all their debts, since if they reveal all of their debts, they will completely clear all of their positions, which maximizes their utility.
Proposition 2. If all agents have a balanced position, it is a Nash equilibrium to reveal all debts.
The easiest way that an agent could misstate his position is by not entering the cycleclearing mechanism at all. However, since the proposition states it is a Nash equilibrium to truthfully reveal all of one's debts, it is a Nash equilibrium for all traders to enter the mechanism, a corollary of the above result is that all agents will wish to enter the mechanism.
Corollary 1. If all agents have a balanced position, it is a Nash equilibrium for all agents to enter the mechanism.
Unbalanced positions
However, if agents do not have balanced positions, the nice properties of cycle removal mechanisms break down. First, a particular cycle removal mechanism will not necessarily be even Pareto efficient, much less efficient in the sense of minimizing the total remaining debts. Consider the example in Figure 1 below, where each arrow denotes the owing of 100
florins: e.g., A owes E and B, and is owed by D, etc., and suppose that α i,j ≡ α for all E and F would be better off if the mechanism removed the smaller cycles first. 27 Hence, as the financial positions of fairgoers becomes more complex, we would expect additions to, or a wholly different mechanism from, the cycle removal mechanism that works well when all positions are balanced.
Hence, we now consider chain removal mechanisms. A chain removal mechanism is, in a certain sense, simpler than a cycle removal mechanism: whenever we find a sequence of agents i 1 , i 2 , i 3 such that d i 1 ,i 2 > 0 and d i 2 ,i 3 > 0, we call this a chain. For any chain,
Hence, since i 1 's debt is passed onto i 3 , the net positions of the three agents do not change. We have not defined the order in which we remove chains. One type of chain removal mechanism is that which removes cycles first, and only afterwards removes chains. The transfer of debts could explain such preferences by merchants. Indeed, the chain removal mechanism can be considered an extension of the cycle removal mechanism. For instance, first using a cycle removal mechanism and then removing the remaining chains (in any order), would still be a chain removal mechanism: we can simply consider removing the cycle as removing the chains in a particular order, as the cycle i 1 , i 2 , ..., i M can be thought of as consisting of the chains i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , then i 2 , i 3 , i 4 , etc.
Furthermore, the chain removal mechanism is exactly what is necessary in order to reduce each trader's position to only debts or only credits, even when positions are unbalanced:
Proposition 3. Any chain removal mechanism will result in each trader having only debts or only credits.
The idea of the proof is straightforward: if some agent has both a credit and a debt, we can use these to find a chain.
Note, however, that the chain removal mechanism is not deterministic: if positions are unbalanced, then different allocations can result from the same starting point, depending on the order of the removal of the chains. Consider the case when A and A both owe B 50 florins, who in turn owes C 50 florins. Then, depending on the order of chain removal, either A or A will owe C 50 florins, while the other will still owes B 50 florins.
Hence, when merchants have preferences over their debtors, it is not necessarily the case that removing a chain results in a Pareto superior allocation; removing a particular chain may make one of the traders worse off, as he now has a debtor whom he disprefers.
In particular, then, if positions are unbalanced (and cash payments to settle positions are not required) and merchants have strong preferences over their debtors, the mechanism may fail to induce much clearing, as merchants will not allow chains to clear which leave them with worse debtors. For instance, C may prefer A as a debtor to A , while B prefers A to A. Then if we clear the A , B, C chain, the resulting allocation will be Pareto inferior to the allocation where we clear the A, B, C chain.
In particular, it may be the case that an agent may not wish to allow certain cycles to clear, so as to avoid exchanging a debt with one member of the mechanism for another. In Figure 1 above, then, if B does not wish to hold a debt from C or F , it is important that he be able to keep the A, B, C, D, A cycle from clearing, as then he can ensure that the B, C, F cycle clears instead. If he did not have this option, then the mechanism would suffer, as then B would have an incentive to deny his debt to C, so as to ensure that the cycles he prefers are the ones to clear.
Another motivation for wishing to choose the cycles that clear is that the merchant may have preferences due to the exchange rates that were used for the clearing. It may be that clearing a particular chain would force the merchant to exchange debts at what the merchant perceives is an unfavorable exchange rate. Hence, at fairs where debts of several currencies are exchanged, it is even more important to give merchants the freedom to choose which chains clear in order to ensure willingness to participate in the mechanism.
However, when agents do not have preferences over which debts they hold, the chain removal mechanism has even stronger strategic properties than the cycle removal mechanism: in particular, it is an optimal strategy for all players, regardless of the actions by other players, to truthfully reveal their debts.
Proposition 4. Suppose that α i,j = α for all i, j ∈ N. Then it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for all agents to truthfully reveal their debts under a chain removal mechanism.
Furthermore, the resulting allocation is Pareto optimal.
The key idea here is that the removal of any given chain can only help the individuals involved. When removing a given chain A, B, C, the utility of A and C remains the same.
However, the utility of B is increased by αd, where d = min {d A,B , d B,C }. Hence, all three agents within the chain or at least weakly better off when the chain clears. This proposition applies particularly to the case where merchants participate in a clearing club, where the assumption that the disutility from a debt is the same across club members is reasonable to apply.
Discussion of the Results in Historical Context
We now consider these theoretical results in their economic and historical context. Theory This is what we found as customary practice earlier on and later regulated in the exchange laws. Crucial in this process is that no questionable bills be used since this would destroy the clearing sequence. Thus, the common practice in the legislation to sort out these bills ex ante can be explained. The fear of using endorsed bills can also be interpreted along this line. As long as the legislation and the enforcement of these liabilities were not clear, endorsed bills could bring disorder into the mechanism as judged by the Frankfurt court.
The willingness of a merchant to participate in a clearing cycle or clearing chain ex ante depends on the expectations of balanced positions ex post or in case of expected unbalanced positions on the likelihood that a creditor gets paid in cash or makes a satisfactory deal by drawing on new bills. If either of these conditions is satisfied, he will participate in any clearing cycle or chain. We can understand the strong fair regulations on balancing positions for example in Besancon or Lyon, i.e. paying cash before the end of the fair and otherwise being declared bankrupt and excluded from any future clearing processes, since this increases the willingness of the wealthy merchants to participate in the clearing mechanism. However, if a merchant expects unbalanced positions at the end, for example if he learns that many merchant bankers will not be able to balance their debts, he will stick to clearing cycles since this guarantees him direct clearing; even a bankrupt clearing partner ex post will not harm him according to the regulations discussed earlier on. If he selects chains he must be careful not to pick a new partner who, as is written in the merchant booklet, turns out to be a bad debtor. If he prefers using cycles only, he might have preferences over the order of the clearing process, since this can determine the outcome and his personal clearing rate by only using cycles. Consequently, we can rationalize all the regulations we found in the exchange legislations which gave the merchant the freedom to participate in any cycle or chain, and to choose in which ordering he liked to clear, as otherwise a merchant may have incentives to misreport his positions in order to change his eventual set of debtors or not to participate at the clearing mechanism at all. Following this line of argument, we can also understand why merchants sometimes preferred clearing debts in cash, since they preferred receiving cash ex ante from the original debtor to trying to cash in the debts from a new debtor due to the clearing process. At the same time the officials who organized the clearing fair had an interest in keeping in as many debtor-creditor pairs as possible because this created positive externalities for other merchants who participated in the clearing. The discussed regulations from Bozen or Leipzig on forced participation can be rationalized in this way.
In addition, the use of strict regulations that forced participants after the mutual settlement to balance their positions can be explained. In an early stage, when such a mechanism was set up by a small number of merchants, we can expect reputational forces to have kept the mechanism running. However, when the number of participants increased, it was necessary to impose legal sanctions. An alternative to this are clearing clubs, where the number of participants is restricted to merchants who know each other. However, the clearing mechanism allows some anonymity. As long as merchants only participate in cycles it does not matter if they need to rely on reputation or legal enforcement ex post since the common amount can be cleared anyway. In addition, in clearing cycles and clearing chains each participant knows at least one partner with whom he had already done business.
Finally, in case one participant rejected a certain clearing chain, he still could search for other clearing partners to proceed with the clearing. Achieving a Pareto efficient clearing depends then on the number of theoretical clearing paths available and on the original liability composition and structure of the merchants. More broadly, the observed mechanism is an institutional solution of an economic world in transition from a reputation-based system to a more anonymous trade-based system with limited centralized outside enforcement options (Greif 2002 (Greif , 2006 .
Furthermore, the mechanism is rather robust and we can expect high clearing rates.
The question then remains under which circumstances the mechanism becomes vulnerable.
The mechanism is robust against small shocks and the bigger the clearing location, the less likely it is that small disturbances will influence the clearing process. However, the mechanism is not robust against heavy shocks as we can observe for example during the Nuremberg were willing to hand in bills which they could not clear easily; for these bills, they preferred to rely on the enforcement of the bank. However, the document also informs us that they handed in only these bills; decentralized clearing for the other bills was still preferred. The enforced participation constraints by other banks also point in this direction. A follow-up question can then be asked: why did merchants prefer not to go to these public banks? We see from sources that document the early phases of these institutions that some exchange banks were chronically short of money. Furthermore, town officials, who governed these banks, were always passing new regulations for these banks (Fuchs 1954, pp. 55-8) . Therefore, the unwillingness of merchants to deposit all of their bills into these banks comes as no surprise. During the early 18 th century Marberger (1717, pp.
98f.) comments on this problem (Schneider 1991, p. 142 ). In addition, by using these new public institutions, merchants would have to reveal certain private business information to these banks, and in many cases the merchants probably did not wish to do so (Velde 2009 ).
Finally, at fairs exchange rates were negotiated by representatives of different merchant groups. In the public banks merchants had to rely on the decision makers of the bank.
Thus, based on this bargaining argument the participants of the fairs could expect better exchange rates at exchange fairs than in public banks. Consequently the later success of the exchange banks must be explained by a slow evolution of trust in these new centralized institutions and other complementary institutional advantages which go beyond the clearing mechanisms (for example see Quinn 2006 Quinn , 2007 .
Conclusion
This paper examined the evolution of a decentralized multilateral debt clearing algorithm for non-or limited-tradable debts during the late medieval and early modern period in Europe. We constructed a simple theoretical model of the mechanism and showed that the mechanism could lead to very high clearing rates. In this way the common use of the mechanism can be rationalized.
We first examined the history of the mechanism. We analyzed the early emergence of this mechanism on Late Medieval markets and fairs and showed how the clearing algorithm developed into a standardized procedure embedded in a legal framework during the early modern period in use all over Europe. We identified the main elements of the procedure, based on legal sources and writings of contemporary witnesses. We then set up a model which simulates the mechanism and identifies the equilibrium outcomes and related strategic behavior of participants.
We showed that the functioning of the mechanisms depends on the balance of positions These results can explain the self-organizing emergence of this mechanism during the late Middle Ages in fair and financial markets and why during the early modern period a specific form of the mechanism embedded in a legal framework evolved all over Europe.
In addition, it can be shown why the mechanism was in general robust and only vulnera- known that all these clearing locations were linked and embedded in a common network.
Therefore the evolution and robustness of this network related to the microeconomic findings of this paper should be further discussed. In particular, the role of unbalanced trade and credit flows would be of great interest.
Since this is true for every agent i, for any agent i a with d i a−1 ,ia > 0, there exists an agent i a+1 such that d ia,i a+1 > 0, as i a holds a balanced position. Hence, we can construct an ordered list of agents i 1 , i 2 , ..., i N , i N +1 for whom d ia,i a+1 > 0. Since there are N + 1 agents in this list, there must be an a and b such that 1 ≤ a < b ≤ i N +1 such that i a = i b .
Hence, there still exists a cycle i a , i a+1 , ..., i b−1 , i a = i b , which contradicts the assumption that all cycles have been removed.
Proposition 2
If all other agents truthfully reveal, it follows from Proposition 1 that agent i will clear all his debts by truthfully revealing. Since this is the best agent i can hope to do under any allocation, this is a best response.
Proposition 3
Assume that all chains are removed and the outcome is not efficient. Then there exists an agent i whose has both a debt with some agent j and is owed a debt by some agent h.
Hence, h, i, j constitutes a chain and not all chains have been removed, a contradiction.
Proposition 4
Let A be the allocation given a truthful revelation by agent i and some revelation by other agents. Then a chain removal mechanism is strategy-proof if i does not want to deny his debt with any j such that d i,j > 0. Lettingd i,j denote the announcement by i, we have that 
